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INTRODUCTION 
Humans have marked their bodies with tattoos for thousands of 
years, with the earliest examples appearing on female mummies 
dating back to 2000 B.C.1  Originally used as a therapeutic means 
of relieving joint pain and as a permanent form of amulet during 
pregnancy, use of tattoos has evolved into a way of marking people 
as belonging to different classes, religious sects, and even 
professions.2  While some cultures tattooed only their criminals, 
 
 1 Cate Lineberry, Tattoos: The Ancient and Mysterious History, SMITHSONIAN 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/ 
tattoo.html.  
 2 Id.  
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others used the permanent markings as a fashion statement.3  In 
America in the mid-1900s, tattoos developed a reputation as the 
mark of American countercultures, sailors and World War II 
veterans.4  Today, many of these religious and personal reasons 
continue to motivate the practice of tattooing. 
The issue of intellectual property rights in images fixed on 
human bodies seems odd considering the constitutional right to do 
as we please with our own bodies.5  Only two lawsuits have ever 
been brought alleging infringement of copyright in a tattoo.  In the 
first case, in 2005, tattoo artist Matthew Reed sued NBA star 
Rasheed Wallace for the unauthorized use of the tattoo Reed 
designed for, and applied to, Wallace, in an advertising campaign 
for Nike.6  Reed claimed that both Nike and the advertising firm 
Weiden + Kennedy violated the copyright Reed held in the 
“Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” tattooed on Wallace’s arm.7  
The parties ultimately settled out of court.8 
The second tattoo infringement case made it only slightly 
further in the litigation process.  In May 2011, Missouri tattoo 
artist Victor Whitmill sued Warner Brothers for the use without 
permission of Whitmill’s copyrighted tattoo—originally fixed on 
the face of the boxer Mike Tyson—on actor Ed Helms’ face in The 
Hangover Part II.9  In the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri, Chief Judge Catherine D. Perry 
recognized Whitmill’s copyright interests in the tattoo, but found 
that the harm to the public interest that would result if the 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 Cassandra Franklin-Barbajosa, Tattoo: Pigments of Imagination, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE (Dec. 2004), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ ngm/0412/ 
online_extra.html. 
 5 See infra notes 30, 154–157 and accompanying text. 
 6 See generally Complaint, Reed v. Nike, CV 05 198, 2005 WL 1182840 (D. Or. 
2005) [hereinafter Reed Complaint]. 
 7 Associated Press, Artist Sues over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812. 
 8 Noam Cohen, On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html?page 
wanted= 2&seid=auto&smid=tw-nytimes. 
 9 Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros. Settles “Hangover II” Tattoo Lawsuit (Exclusive), 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter. 
com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377. 
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preliminary injunction sought by Whitmill were granted 
outweighed any such interests.10  Accordingly, she denied 
Whitmill’s motion for an injunction, ensuring the release of The 
Hangover Part II.11 
Both Reed and Whitmill implicated numerous interests: the 
copyright interests of the tattoo artist, the copyright interests of the 
subject, the right of a person to control his body, and the interests 
of the public in reaping the benefits of artist creativity.  These 
cases also illustrate two main copyright infringement problems that 
may arise with tattoos: (1) the direct copying of a popular 
copyrighted tattoo onto another “canvas” (in Whitmill, the direct 
copying of Whitmill’s design onto Helms’s face without 
permission); and (2) the appearance of an original tattoo in a 
subsequent work (for example, Tyson’s appearance in the movie 
and Wallace’s appearance in the commercial could violate the 
owner’s exclusive rights to reproduce the work and to display the 
work publicly).12 
Resolving the conflicts among the various parties’ interests and 
resolving issues of tattoo infringement requires first addressing the 
copyrightability of tattoos and then, assuming tattoos are in fact 
copyrightable, determining the ownership interests in the tattoo. 
This Note will focus on conflicts that arise with regard to 
original tattoo designs, as opposed to tattoos featuring already-
copyrighted or trademarked images.  The analysis and argument 
will consider only those issues that arise when an original tattoo 
design is copied onto another person or is featured in a subsequent 
work.  This Note argues that when considering such issues, courts 
should balance the interests of the artist, the human subject, and 
the general public.  Ultimately, courts resolving tattoo 
 
 10 Yvette Joy Liebesman, Copyright and Tattoos: Hangover II Injunction Denied, but 
the Copyright Owner Got Some Good News Too, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG 
(May 24, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/copyright_and_t.htm. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Two of a copyright owner’s six exclusive rights include the right to reproduce and to 
display the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(5).  While Whiltmill could have 
claimed an infringement of this right by Tyson’s appearing in the film, Whitmill has 
granted Tyson permission to make such appearances.  He has, however, denied Tyson the 
right to reproduce the work in other forms. See Liebesman, supra note 10. 
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infringement cases should afford thinner copyright protection to 
tattoos than they would to other copyrighted works.  Part I outlines 
the provisions of copyright law relevant to the analysis of the 
copyrightability of tattoos.  Part II illustrates the conflicts that arise 
among the various interests at stake, explains what courts have 
done when faced with these conflicts, and notes several problems 
that arise in tattoo infringement cases.  Part III proposes a solution 
to these conflicts and offers a guide to future courts addressing the 
issues of copyright interests in body tattoos. 
I. COPYRIGHT LAW UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1976 
This Part reviews the provisions of copyright law relevant to 
the analysis of copyrights in the tattoo context, including types of 
copyrightable work, forms of copyright ownership, exclusive 
rights of copyright owners, the doctrine of fair use, and remedies 
for infringement.  It also provides a background of the policy 
underlying modern copyright law and an overview of the goals of 
the 1976 Copyright Act. 
A. Policy Underlying the Copyright Act 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
promote science and the useful arts by granting copyright 
ownership to authors of original works.13  The main goal of 
providing authors with a limited monopoly in the rights to their 
creations is to stimulate and incentivize artistic creativity for the 
good of the general public.14  Thus, in the analysis of copyrights 
and tattoos, public interest plays an important role, in addition to 
the interests of the artist and the subject.15 
For purposes of copyright law, a work is “created” the first 
time it is fixed in a copy.16  Ownership of the work vests initially 
 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 15 For example, public interest weighed heavily in Judge Perry’s decision to deny 
Whitmill’s request for a preliminary injunction in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. See 
Liebesman, supra note 10. 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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in the author who transcribes an idea into a fixed, tangible 
expression that is entitled to copyright protection.17  If an 
expression meets this requirement, section 106 of the Copyright 
Act grants the author a number of exclusive rights in the work.18  
The author may then transfer ownership of all or some of these 
rights to another party.19  For example, the author may retain the 
right to prepare derivative works, but may transfer the rights to 
distribute and reproduce the original work to someone better suited 
to maximize the benefits of those rights.  Therefore, permitting the 
transfer of some exclusive rights helps to ensure their most 
effective use.  Defining the author, and thus the owner, of a tattoo 
is especially critical because of the potential conflict between the 
exclusive rights of a copyright owner and the right of a subject to 
control his own body. 
B. Classifying the Work 
Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines the eight 
eligible categories of copyrightable works.20  How a work is 
categorized is important because certain works are subject to 
different protections and exclusive rights.21 
Tattoos most likely fall under the category of pictorial, graphic 
or sculptural works.22  Such works include two-and three-
dimensional works of “fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, 
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, 
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”23  
A tattoo is, quite literally, applied art (although copyright law 
 
 17 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).  This 
principle tends to indicate that ownership vests in the artist who physically creates the 
work, however, parties other than the actual creator may be an author for purposes of 
copyright law and thus an owner. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 19 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006). 
 20 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 21 For example, owners of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works do not enjoy the 
right to publicly perform their work, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), and owners of works of visual 
arts are entitled to the right of attribution and integrity, 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 22 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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contemplates a different meaning for the term “applied art”).24  For 
purposes of categorization, a tattoo is undoubtedly graphic art 
applied to a three-dimensional canvas and thus may be classified as 
a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. 
If a tattoo meets certain statutory requirements, it could qualify 
as a “work of visual art.”25  To be a work of visual art, the work 
must exist in a single copy or in a “limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”26  
Original tattoos that exist in a single “copy” could be deemed a 
work of visual art.  However, an artist who applies the same image 
to more than one subject would have to sign and consecutively 
number each of the works.  Given the “canvas” on which tattoo 
artists transcribe their work, it would be highly burdensome to 
comply with these requirements.  Thus, it seems unlikely that 
original tattoos appearing in more than one copy could qualify as 
works of visual art. 
Whether a tattoo is a pictorial, graphical or sculptural work or a 
work of visual art is significant to the extent that the classification 
affects rights to which the owner of the work is entitled.  An owner 
of a work of visual art is entitled to the exclusive rights under 
section 106 and, additionally, the right of attribution and integrity 
under section 106A.27  An owner of a pictorial, graphical or 
sculptural work is entitled only to the exclusive rights under 
section 106, and does not enjoy the right to publicly perform the 
work.28 
C. Determining Ownership 
It is important to note that ownership of a copyright, or 
ownership of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright, “is distinct 
from ownership of any material object in which the work is 
 
 24 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5667–68 (distinguishing works of “applied art,” protectable under the Copyright 
Act, from works of “industrial design,” which are not afforded protection). 
 25 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “work of visual art”). 
 26 Id.   
 27 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006). 
 28 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
C07_HATIC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:36 PM 
2012] WHO OWNS YOUR BODY ART? 403 
embodied.”29  Accordingly, even if the author and owner for 
purposes of copyright law is deemed to be someone other than the 
human subject, that owner only has an interest in the work, and not 
in the body of the subject.  Even though a tattoo artist who is the 
owner of a copyrighted tattoo on another person has no direct 
property interest in that person, in exercising some of his exclusive 
rights, the owner’s rights will nevertheless interfere with the 
subject’s constitutional right to control his own body.30 
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the tattoo’s 
creation, the “author” of the tattoo, for purposes of determining 
initial ownership, could be the tattoo artist (or his employer, in the 
work-for-hire context), the human subject, or both.31  In the first 
situation, the artist is the sole author and owner.  In this scenario, 
the tattoo artist is a sole proprietor who, much like a painter or 
photographer, owns all of copyright interests in the work from the 
moment it is fixed on the subject. 
In a second possible scenario, the tattoo is a joint work, 
meaning that two or more authors prepared the work with the 
intention that their contributions would merge into “inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”32  For example, a subject 
contributes specific ideas about, or rough sketches of, what the 
tattoo should look like and an artist, literally, embodies those ideas 
in the subject.33  Authorship is not the same as merely making a 
copyrightable contribution to a work.34  Thus, in a joint work 
arrangement, the authors must also intend that their individual 
contributions be merged into one whole work.35  Authors of a joint 
 
 29 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 30 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing 
a constitutional right to personal autonomy).  
 31 See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual 
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 
104–07 (2003). 
 32 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 33 This process of both parties making creative contributions occurs frequently in the 
tattoo context. See, e.g., Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 34 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 35 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 
1994) (noting that the fact that several parties contributed contemporaneously is 
insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement); see also Kaplan v. Vincent, 937 F. Supp. 
307, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (outlining two factors helpful in determining whether the 
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work co-own the copyright in the work.36  In the tattoo context, 
this ownership arrangement presents the fewest interferences with 
the subject’s constitutional right to control his own body; it allows 
each owner to use or to license the use of the work so long as he 
accounts to the other co-owners for any profits derived from such 
use or licensing.37 
In a third possible situation, the tattoo is a “work made for 
hire.”  A work made for hire is a work either prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his employment, or “specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective 
work.”38  For purposes of copyright ownership, the employer—or 
the other person for whom the work was prepared—is considered 
the author, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in a signed 
written instrument.39  A tattoo that is a work made for hire might 
exist in two different scenarios.  In the first, the tattoo parlor that 
employs the artist might claim that the work is one made for hire 
because it was created within the scope of the artist’s employment 
with the company.  In this case, the tattoo parlor company is the 
author for purposes of copyright ownership.  In the second 
scenario, the tattoo may constitute a work made for hire if the 
subject specially ordered or commissioned the work for use as a 
contribution to a collective work.40  Conceivably, one could argue 
that a body bearing multiple tattoos is a “collective work,” and by 
specially commissioning another tattoo, the multi-tattooed subject 
could be the author of the work-for-hire tattoo, provided the parties 
signed the requisite written instrument.  However, this example 
hinges on the classification of multiple tattoos on a human body as 
 
parties had the requisite intent: whether each party intended all parties be identified as co-
authors and how the parties “regarded themselves in relation to the work”). 
 36 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 37 See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 38 A “collective work” is a work in which a number of contributions, that constitute 
separate and independent works, are assembled into a collective whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
A work for hire arrangement only exists, however, “if the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire.” Id. 
 39 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 40 17 U.S.C. § 101.   
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a “collective work,” which might be a somewhat far-fetched 
classification.41 
D. Exclusive Rights 
The 1976 Copyright Act grants copyright owners six exclusive 
rights with regard to their copyrighted works: (1) to reproduce the 
work; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the work; (3) to 
distribute the work; (4) to perform the work publicly; (5) to display 
the work publicly; and (6) to perform the work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission.42  The fourth right—to perform the 
work publicly—would not apply if a tattoo is deemed a pictorial, 
graphical or sculptural work, but would apply if it is a work of 
visual art.43  The sixth right—public performance—is irrelevant to 
the analysis of copyrighted tattoos. 
1. The Right to Reproduce 
The first exclusive right under section 106 grants copyright 
owners the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies44 or 
phonorecords.”45  There are two threshold requirements associated 
with the reproduction right: the fixation requirement and the 
intelligibility requirement.  To meet the fixation requirement, the 
embodiment of the work must be “sufficiently permanent or stable 
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”46  To 
satisfy the intelligibility requirement, it is necessary that the fixed 
work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
either directly, or with the aid of a machine or device.”47  Tattoos 
are permanently embodied in a person’s skin; therefore, they may 
 
 41 Arguably, each tattoo on a single subject could constitute a “separate and 
independent work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.  The problem in making this argument is 
establishing that the individual works are assembled into a “collective whole,” in the way 
that individual articles are assembled into the collective work of a newspaper. Id. 
 42 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 43 Id. 
 44 “Copies” consist of material objects in which the work is fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 45 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 46 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 47 Id. 
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be perceived for more than a period of “transitory duration”48 and 
satisfy the fixation requirement.  Furthermore, people perceive 
tattoos directly—simply by looking at them—thus, they also 
satisfy the intelligibility requirement.  Tattoos are both fixed and 
intelligible; therefore, an owner of a copyrighted tattoo would 
enjoy the right to reproduce. 
2. The Right to Prepare Derivative Works 
A derivative work is a work based on preexisting material that 
may be “recast, transformed, or adapted.”49  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that the underlying material must be copyrightable 
for a work based on that material to qualify as a derivative work 
under the statute.50  The language of the statute itself also 
establishes the requirement that the underlying work be 
copyrightable; under section 106, the copyright owner has the 
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”51  Thus, to create a derivative work of a tattoo, 
the preexisting tattoo must be copyrightable. 
A derivative work consists of modifications, which, as a whole, 
represent an “original work of authorship.”52  The Second Circuit 
has held that a derivative work is independently copyrightable if it 
is “sufficiently original,”53 and established a two-prong test for 
determining whether a subsequent work is copyrightable as a 
derivative work.54  First, the original aspects of the derivative work 
must be “more than trivial.”55  Second, the original aspects of the 
subsequent work must reflect the degree to which it relies on the 
preexisting work and must not affect the scope of the copyright 
 
 48 Id.  
 49 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 50 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).   
 51 17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added).  
 52 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 53 See Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 54 See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980).  The 
Ninth Circuit has also adopted this two-prong approach to evaluating the copyrightability 
of derivative works. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 
F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 55 See Durham, 630 F.2d at 909. 
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protection in the preexisting material.56  Under the originality 
standard articulated above, to create a derivative work of an 
original tattoo, an artist would need to do more than simply “touch 
up” the work.  Under the Second Circuit’s test, assuming that the 
modifications or additions to a tattoo are sufficiently original and 
substantial to rise to the level of an independently copyrightable 
work, it is possible to create a derivative work of a tattoo. 
Where a tattoo artist is also the owner of the copyright in a 
tattoo, as one of his exclusive rights he is entitled to prepare 
derivative works of that tattoo.  In this scenario, enforcing the 
artist’s right to prepare derivative works could give rise to several 
problems given the constitutional right of a person to control his or 
her body.57 
3. The Right to Distribute 
Copyright owners also enjoy the right to distribute copies of 
their work to the public “by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending.”58  Because of the nature of the 
medium in which the tattoo is fixed, distribution in the tattoo 
context is decidedly different than distribution in the context of 
more traditional media such as books or computer software.  This 
right is unlikely to be infringed in the tattoo context given that 
tattoos are fixed upon human skin.  However, in the practice of 
tattooing, artists often create sketches or stencils of their designs.  
If an artist copyrights a particular tattoo and fixes that image in a 
separate and independently copyrightable tattoo sketch or stencil, 
he may claim his exclusive right to distribute copies of the stencils 
to other tattoo parlors or artists. 
4. The Rights to Perform Publicly and to Display Publicly 
Owners of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works are entitled 
to the exclusive right to display the work publicly, but not to 
perform the work publicly.59  Owners of works of visual art enjoy 
 
 56 See id. 
 57 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 58 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).  
 59 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5). 
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both the right to perform and to display their works publicly.60  
However, this is a distinction without any significance in the 
context of tattoos; whether the author is entitled to the right to 
publicly perform makes no difference because tattoos cannot be 
“performed.”61   
Regardless of whether the tattoo is pictorial, graphic or 
sculptural or one of visual art, the owner has the exclusive right to 
have the work displayed in public.  Where the tattoo artist is also 
the copyright owner, enforcement of this right will present a 
significant conflict with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy.  In 
the absence of an implied license to have his tattoo publicly 
visible, a subject would infringe the artist’s right under section 
106(4) or section 106(5) any time he appears in public.62  To avoid 
such infringement, the subject would need to cover the tattoo when 
venturing into the public realm.  Of all of the rights granted to 
copyright holders, enforcement of the right to display publicly 
presents the greatest likelihood of interfering with a subject’s right 
to personal autonomy.63 
5. The Rights of Certain Authors to Attribution and Integrity 
While the right to attribution and integrity is not one of the six 
exclusive rights granted to copyright owners under section 106, it 
is a right enjoyed by authors of works of visual arts.64  Under this 
right, an owner of a tattoo classified as a work of visual art is 
entitled to “prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation.”65  It is unlikely that many tattoos would meet 
the statutory requirements of a work of visual art.  However, where 
 
 60 See id. 
 61 “To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or 
by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 62 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 63 See infra Part III.C (discussing why this right should belong to the human subject 
either implicitly or by written instrument before tattoo’s creation). 
 64 17 U.S.C. § 106(A). 
 65 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).  “The authors of a joint work of visual art are co-owners 
of the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).   
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a tattoo does qualify as such a work, the right to attribution and 
integrity afforded to the owner of the work could present additional 
conflicts with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy.  Arguably, 
where a tattooed subject decided to alter his tattoo, or perhaps even 
remove it, the artist (if he were the owner) would have the right to 
prevent such a modification.  As with the enforcement of an 
artist/owner’s right to public display, enforcing the right to 
attribution and integrity could potentially conflict with the 
subject’s constitutional right to control his own body. 
E. Fair Use as a Defense 
In some cases, the doctrine of fair use66 may be a relevant 
defense to the unauthorized use of a copyrighted tattoo.67  In such 
instances, the conflicts between an artist/owner’s enforcement of 
his exclusive rights and the subject’s right to control his body may 
be resolved by invoking a fair use defense. 
The Supreme Court has recognized fair use as a safeguard in 
copyright law for balancing the interests of copyright owners in 
controlling their works with the free speech and expression 
interests of both subsequent authors and the general public.68  
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that the use of a 
copyrighted work for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research” generally does not 
infringe the copyright.69  Essentially, fair use allows authors to 
draw upon preexisting works for purposes of criticizing, 
 
 66 Courts consider four relevant factors when determining whether the unauthorized 
use of a copyrighted work is nonetheless a non-infringing fair use: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) 
the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyright work. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2006).  The fair use doctrine is not a bright line test and requires case-by-case 
analysis. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).  
Furthermore, no one factor is dispositive. See id. 
 67 For example, in Whitmill v. Warner Bros., Warner Brothers argued that its 
unauthorized use of Whitmill’s copyrighted tattoo on Helms’ face was a non-infringing 
fair use because it parodied Tyson’s original tattoo. See Warner Bros. Memo. in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Prelim. Injunction, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. 2011) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Memo.]. 
 68 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 69 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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disseminating news, teaching or commentary in order to further 
Congress’s and the Copyright Act’s goals of promoting science 
and the useful arts and stimulating creativity.70 
Fair use of a copyrighted tattoo is most likely to occur in the 
form of parody or in the course of news reporting.  For instance, in 
television shows such as Saturday Night Live, or in comedic films 
such as The Hangover Part II, filmmakers might directly copy a 
well-known tattoo in order to conjure up the original work and to 
comment on or criticize either the preexisting work or the subject 
on which it appears.71  In such cases, it is likely the use would 
qualify as a protected parody of the original work.  Additionally, in 
instances where a paparazzo photographs a visibly tattooed 
celebrity and publishes the photo without permission, such “use” 
of the original work could also be protected as a fair form of news 
reporting.72 
F. Remedies 
A copyright owner must register his copyright before an 
infringement occurs to be eligible to receive statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees under section 504(c).73  Section 412 of the 
Copyright Act aims to ensure that such damages are reserved for 
those infringers who had constructive notice that the work upon 
which they infringed was protected by a valid copyright, which is 
presumed upon the owner’s registration of the work.74 
G. Actual Damages 
A copyright owner may recover actual damages suffered as 
result of infringement, as well as the infringer’s profits that are 
attributable to the infringement and that are not considered in 
 
 70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 71 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 591–94 (holding that the potentially infringing 
artist’s song was a valid parody that necessarily mimicked the original song in order to 
criticize and comment on it). 
 72 See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (deeming 
newsworthy the day-to-day actions of public figures). 
 73 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). 
 74 See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998).  
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computing the actual damages.75  Generally, courts aim to award 
damages proportionate to the copyright owner’s damages, and no 
more.76  In Whitmill, Whitmill sought both compensatory damages 
as well as the portion of Warner Brothers’ profits from The 
Hangover Part II.77  Had the case reached the stage where the 
court would calculate damages, Whitmill could have potentially 
received any actual damages resulting from the infringement, as 
well as a portion of Warner Brothers’ profits from the film that the 
court deemed attributable to the infringement of Whitmill’s tattoo.  
However, for a plaintiff to be entitled to damages for indirect 
profits from the unauthorized use of infringing material, there must 
be a “legally sufficient causal link” between the infringement and 
any subsequent indirect profits.78 
H. Statutory Damages 
If an owner registered his copyright prior to the infringement 
then, before a final judgment is rendered, the owner may choose to 
recover statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits in 
an amount of no less than $750 and no more than $30,000.79  
Infringement plaintiffs tend to select statutory damages in cases 
where there are no actual damages, where actual damages are 
particularly difficult to calculate, or where actual damages are 
considerably less than statutory ones.  In tattoo infringement cases, 
actual damages would likely be considerably lower than the range 
of damages available through the statute.  For example, courts have 
 
 75 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  A successful infringement plaintiff may receive a portion of 
direct profits attributable to the infringing material as well as indirect profits attributable 
to the infringing work. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 
505, 514 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff was entitled to a portion of defendant’s net 
revenue from the show that featured the infringing material, as well as a portion of 
indirect profits attributable to the infringing material, including profits from related hotel 
and gambling operations). 
 76 See, e.g., Frank Music Corp., 772 F.2d at 517–20. (conducting extensive 
mathematical analysis to determine proportion of defendants’ profits attained due to 
infringing material). 
 77 See Complaint, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752, 2011 WL 
2038147 at 8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Whitmill Complaint]. 
 78 See Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 915 (2002).  
 79 17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(1) (2006).  Should a court find the infringement was committed 
willfully, the court may, in its discretion, increase the statutory damages award to not 
more than $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(2).  
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awarded actual damages for loss of customers due to 
infringement,80 lost licensing fees due to infringement,81 and lost 
royalty payments due to infringement.82  None of these losses, 
however, seem relevant in the tattoo context.  It seems highly 
unlikely that Reed would have lost customers as a result of Nike’s 
commercial featuring Wallace’s Egyptian tattoo.  If anything, such 
infringement was the “exposure” Reed hoped to benefit from by 
having his work fixed to a popular NBA player.83  Thus, in tattoo 
cases where actual damages are extremely low, difficult to prove 
or nonexistent, infringement plaintiffs may still recover monetary 
damages under the statutory provisions. 
I. Injunctive Relief 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a court may grant a temporary 
or permanent injunction where it deems such relief reasonable to 
prevent copyright infringement.84  Under the Supreme Court’s 
holding in eBay v. MercExchange, courts must evaluate the 
traditional four factors considered in injunctive relief before 
granting a final injunction.85  In the tattoo context, injunctive relief 
could be sought to prevent, inter alia, the unauthorized copying of 
the work onto other canvases, the release of subsequent works 
featuring the tattoo, and the attempt of the original subject to 
modify or remove the work.  Each of these requests would create a 
 
 80 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, 685 F. Supp. 698, 
711–12 (D. Minn. 1987). 
 81 See, e.g., Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 829 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (finding copyright owner entitled to recover value of license where 
unauthorized use eliminated owner’s opportunity to license song). 
 82 See, e.g., Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. and Scientific Commc’n Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 
935, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (awarding actual damages for lost royalty payments plaintiff 
would have received for use of its source code in the absence of infringement). 
 83 See Associated Press, Artist Sues Over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812. 
 84 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006). 
 85 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  To be entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) that it suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate 
to compensate for the injury; (3) that considering the balance of the hardships between 
the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See id. at 391–92.  While this 
case arose in the patent context, the Court noted that the rule established in eBay is 
consistent with the treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. Id at 392. 
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great deal of conflict with not only the public interest in benefitting 
from artist creativity and in exercising the right of free expression, 
but also with the constitutional right to control one’s own body.86  
Because of these conflicts, courts should be especially wary of 
granting injunctive relief to tattoo infringement plaintiffs. 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 
Part II examines the interests at stake in cases of copyrighted 
tattoos and illustrates the conflicts that arise among these various 
interests.  This Part also highlights how courts have handled 
conflicts among the parties’ interests.  Finally, Part II examines the 
policy arguments for and against granting tattoos the same degree 
of copyright protection as more traditional works. 
A. Two Infringement Scenarios 
The two lawsuits involving the unauthorized use of a 
copyrighted tattoo87 present the two main infringement problems 
that may arise with original art works tattooed on human bodies: 
(1) the direct copying of the original tattoo onto another person or 
medium of expression, and (2) when the artist is also the copyright 
owner, the appearance of the original subject bearing the tattoo in a 
subsequent work without permission of the owner.88 
B. Tattoos, Copyrights, and the Courts 
Interestingly, very little case law exists in the realm of 
copyrights and tattoos.  Indeed, Whitmill is only the second lawsuit 
in which a tattoo artist sued for copyright infringement of a work 
of body art.89  In Whitmill, despite openly empathizing with the 
 
 86 See infra Parts II.C–D. 
 87 See generally Reed Complaint, supra note 6; Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67. 
 88 While in this case Whitmill did not actually sue Mike Tyson for appearing in the 
film without permission, this potential infringement claim is one that could arise in cases 
similar to this one. See Liebesman, supra note 10.  This was the issue in Reed. 
 89 See Matthew Heller, Tyson Tattoo Creates Legal Headache for “Hangover 2,” ON 
POINT NEWS (May 1, 2011), http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/Tyson-Tattoo-Creates-
Legal-Headache-for-Hangover-2.html.  Also in 2005, artist Louis Molloy, who applied 
nine of soccer star David Beckham’s tattoos, threatened to sue Beckham when he 
discovered Beckham wanted to use some of the tattoos in an advertising campaign. See 
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tattoo artist Whitmill, Judge Perry of the Eastern District of 
Missouri denied the artist’s request to enjoin the release of The 
Hangover Part II, finding that the public interest in having the film 
released far outweighed Whitmill’s copyright interests in his tattoo 
design.90  In the other tattoo copyright infringement case, Reed v. 
Nike, the parties settled.91  Although the case was never litigated, 
examining this lawsuit’s facts reveals that similar conflicts among 
interests arise in cases of alleged infringement of tattoos. 
1. Whitmill v. Warner Brothers 
In 2003, Victor Whitmill designed an original tattoo for the 
former heavyweight champion Mike Tyson.92  On the day 
Whitmill applied the tattoo to Tyson’s face, Tyson signed a 
“Tattoo Release Form” acknowledging, “all artwork, sketches and 
drawings related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his] tattoo 
are property of Paradox-Studio of Dermagraphics.”93  Although 
ownership vests in the author at the time of fixation,94 Whitmill did 
not officially register his work with the Copyright Office until 
April of 2011.95  In 2009, Tyson appeared in The Hangover, a 
movie released by Warner Brothers.96  Whitmill did not object to 
Tyson’s appearance in the film or to the use of Tyson’s tattoo in 
the advertising and promotion for the film.97  In 2011, Tyson 
appeared in The Hangover Part II, the sequel to The Hangover.98  
In The Hangover Part II, one of the main characters, played by 
 
Fiona Cummins & Sharon Feinstein, Exclusive: I Own Beck’s Tattoo . . . and I’ll Sue, 
DAILY MIRROR (June 27, 2005), http://www.mirror.co.uk/celebs/news/2005/06/27/ 
exclusive-i-own-beck-s-tattoo-and-i-ll-sue-115875-15668908. 
 90 See Noam Cohen, Citing Public Interest, Judge Rules for “Hangover II”, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 24, 2011, 4:05pm), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/ 
citing-public-interest-judge-rules-for-hangover-ii. 
 91 See Cohen, supra note 8. 
 92 See Heller, supra note 89.   
 93 See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 77, at 3. 
 94 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).   
 95 Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 9. 
 96 Id. at 5–6. 
 97 Id. at 6. 
 98 Id. at 5–7. 
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actor Ed Helms, appears in the film bearing an almost identical 
facial tattoo to that of Mike Tyson.99 
100 
Warner Brothers used footage of Helms sporting the tattoo in 
its trailer for the film and in other advertising and promotional 
materials.101  Subsequently, Whitmill filed a complaint against 
Warner Brothers alleging copyright infringement of his original 
tattoo.102  In his complaint, Whitmill sought a preliminary and a 
permanent injunction, enjoining Warner Brothers from using the 
tattoo on Ed Helms’ face “in the Movie and otherwise.”103  
Whitmill also sought compensatory damages and an award of 
Warner Brothers’ profits resulting from the alleged 
infringement.104 
 
 
 99 Id. at 8. 
 100 David Kravets, Warner Bros. Sued for Using Mike Tyson’s Tattoo in New Movie, 
WIRED (May 2, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/infringing-
tattoo. 
 101 Warner Bros.’ Memo., supra note 67, at 8. 
 102 See generally Whitmill Complaint, supra note 77. 
 103 See id.  
 104 See id. 
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  105 106 
In his action, Whitmill sued only Warner Brothers and brought 
no claim against Tyson.107  Thus, the second infringement 
situation—where a copyrighted tattoo on a person appears in a 
subsequent work without the owner’s permission—is not at issue 
here.  The court’s decision in Whitmill is quite brief and sheds light 
only on how to handle an instance of direct copying of an original 
tattoo without permission of the copyright owner. 
C. The Parody Defense 
Warner Brothers argued first that tattoos should not be entitled 
to any copyright protection.108  Alternatively, Warner Brothers 
argued that even if the court recognized a copyright interest in the 
tattoo, the film’s use of the tattoo was permissible under the fair 
use doctrine and thus did not infringe upon Whitmill’s 
copyright.109  Judge Perry rejected Warner Brother’s defense of 
fair use.110  She ruled that the “tattoo” on Ed Helms’ face in the 
 
 105 The Hangover Part II (2011), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (last visited Oct. 11, 
2012), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1411697. 
 106 The Hangover Part 2 Poster: Ed Helms, ABOUT.COM (last visited Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://movies.about.com/od/thehangover2/ig/Hangover-2-Posters/Ed-Helms-Poster.htm. 
 107 Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 18; see Liebesman, supra note 10. 
 108 Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 13. 
 109 Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Can You Copyright a Tattoo?, FREAKONOMICS 
(May 2, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/05/02/can-you-copyright-
a-tattoo. 
 110 See Matthew David, Tyson Tattoo Trouble, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (May 25, 
2011), http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/tyson-tattoo-trouble.  Should this case 
have been appealed and a different court have the fair use analysis,Warner Brothers may 
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film was an exact copy that “did not comment on the artist’s work 
or have any critical bearing on the original composition.”111  
Because there was no change to the tattoo, there was no parody.112  
In her rejection of Warner Brothers’ fair use defense, Judge Perry 
also noted that the use of the tattoo on Helms’ face was not 
necessary to the movie plot and that Warner Brothers used the 
tattoo extensively in its marketing and promotion of the movie.113  
She also found that the plaintiff met his burden of proving 
irreparable harm by showing the “loss of control over his 
design.”114 
D. Balancing the Interests 
Ultimately Judge Perry ruled that the “balancing of the equities 
and the harm to the public if the injunction were granted” weighed 
in favor of Warner Brothers.115  She recognized that Whitmill had 
a copyright interest in the tattoo and that his interest was infringed 
by Warner Brother’s use, but excused the use anyway on the 
grounds of “public interest.”116  It is interesting that though she 
excused the use and denied the injunction, she did so in the name 
of public interest instead of using the statutory excuse of fair use—
especially where the parody argument was arguably quite strong. 
Whitmill illustrates that the underlying policy behind the 
Copyright Act—to promote science and the useful arts for the 
overall benefit of the public—supports heavily weighing the public 
 
have a better chance of asserting its transformative use defense. See, e.g., Yvette J. 
Liebesman, Copyright and Tattoos: Hangover II Injunction Denied, but the Copyright 
Owner Got Some Good News Too—Whitmill v. Warner Bros.; ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH & 
MKTG. LAW BLOG, (May 24, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives 
/2011/05/copyright_and_t.htm. 
 111 See id.  This finding indicates that Judge Perry rejected Warner Brothers’ argument 
that the subsequent use of the tattoo was transformative under the first prong of the fair 
use defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
 112 See David, supra note 110. 
 113 See Liebesman, supra note 10.  These notes suggest that Judge Perry determined 
that the commercial nature of the use and the lack of transformativeness of the use 
weighed against a finding of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 114 Joe Mullin, Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are ‘Silly’, Says Judge, 
PAIDCONTENT.ORG (May 24, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-judge-
shows-sympathy-for-plaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case. 
 115 See Liebesman, supra note 10. 
 116 See id. 
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interest when determining whether to grant injunctive relief to a 
tattoo infringement plaintiff. 
E. Reed v. Nike 
While the lawsuit involving the Oregon tattoo artist Matthew 
Reed and the tattoo on the NBA star Rasheed Wallace was never 
litigated, the facts reveal that similar interests are implicated in 
other cases involving a subsequent, unauthorized use of a 
copyrighted tattoo. 
1. The Facts 
The only tattoo copyright infringement case besides Whitmill v. 
Warner Bros. involved tattoo artist Matthew Reed, who sued Nike 
and an advertising company after Nike used the design that he had 
created for NBA player Rasheed Wallace in an advertising 
campaign.117  In 1998, Reed met with Wallace to discuss the art 
design that would become the tattoo.118  During the initial meeting, 
Wallace signed an “Information and Release Document,” which 
was the only written agreement between the parties and which did 
not mention any assignment of Reed’s copyright interest in the 
work.119  In a second meeting, Wallace proposed changes to the 
sketch Reed had drawn120 and, over course of three sessions, Reed 
applied the tattoo to Wallace.121  Wallace paid Reed $450, which 
Reed considered a low price but believed was worth the exposure 
he and his business would get from his tattoo appearing on an 
NBA player.122 
 
 
 117 See Heller, supra note 89. 
 118 See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 119 Id. at 3. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 3–4. 
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 123            124 
In 2004, Reed learned that Wallace’s tattoo was featured as 
part of a Nike advertising campaign.125  Reed was never contacted 
about the use of his original artwork in the form of Wallace’s 
tattoo in the commercial.126  Reed had registered a copyright for 
the “Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” that was the basis of the 
tattoo he applied to Wallace’s arm.127  Reed sued Nike and the 
advertising firm Weiden + Kennedy, alleging that the defendants 
“copied, reproduced, distributed, adapted and/or publicly 
displayed” his copyrighted work without his consent.128 
2. The Conflicts 
This case involves conflicting interests among the copyright 
ownership interests of the artist, the right to publicity of the 
subject, and the right of the public to benefit from subsequent 
works featuring a unique and noteworthy tattoo on a popular 
basketball player. 
In this case, Reed was the sole author and owner of the 
copyrighted tattoo.  While Wallace and Reed worked together to 
develop the design, their mere collaboration was insufficient to 
establish intent to create a joint work or to establish a work for hire 
arrangement.129  Because Reed was the sole owner of the 
copyrighted work and Nike and its advertising agency used it in a 
 
 123 Rasheed Wallace, THE ATHLETE TATTOO DATABASE (last visited Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://athletetattoodatabase.com/Rasheed+Wallace. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 4. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. at 4–5. 
 129 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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subsequent work without Reed’s permission, the use infringed 
Reed’s exclusive rights. 
Through the right of publicity, Wallace had an interest in 
promoting his own name and likeness, including the part of his 
body featuring his tattoo.  The right of publicity is “the inherent 
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or 
her identity.”130  Here, while Reed undoubtedly held a copyright 
interest in the tattoo and thus had a right to prevent unauthorized 
reproduction, public display or derivative works, Wallace also 
undoubtedly had a right to exploit his persona—including his 
tattoo—in his endorsement deal with Nike.  Likewise, Nike had an 
interest in exploiting Wallace as a spokesperson for its products, 
including featuring the elements of his persona that make him a 
popular athlete and thus an effective Nike representative.  Finally, 
the public arguably had an interest in viewing a work featuring an 
interesting tattoo on a popular professional basketball player. 
While this case settled out of court, had it reached litigation, 
the court would have needed to consider all these competing 
interests and not only the copyright interest of the artist.  In tattoo 
cases, because of the nature of the medium in which the 
copyrighted work is fixed, interests including the right to publicity 
and the constitutional right to control one’s body must weigh more 
heavily in determining whether infringement occurred and in 
deciding whether to award damages or injunctive relief than in 
cases involving more traditional copyrighted works. 
F. Policing Problems 
Two hypothetical situations developing the problems of direct 
copying and featuring a copyrighted tattoo in a subsequent work 
will elucidate issues surrounding the policing of infringement in 
tattoo cases. 
 
 130 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. Mar. 
2011); see Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(defining the right of publicity as meaning, in essence, “that the reaction of the public to 
name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed and planned, 
endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable 
opportunities”) (citation omitted). 
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First, to illustrate the direct copying problem: a teacher in 
Tallahassee, Florida who is an avid Manchester United fan gets a 
replica of David Beckham’s guardian angel tattoo inked across his 
back.  In this scenario, few people will know about the tattoo, and 
few will care that it is an unauthorized copy of an original work.  
Here, the direct copying of the angel tattoo onto the teacher’s body 
undoubtedly infringes upon tattoo artist Louis Molloy’s copyright 
of the angel tattoo,131 but who will police this infringement?  
Furthermore, which party committed the infringement in this 
case—the teacher or the tattoo artist who applied the image to the 
teacher? 
Second, to illustrate the problem of featuring a copyrighted 
tattoo in a subsequent work: a paparazzo snaps a picture of Heidi 
Klum in which her wave and star tattoo is clearly visible, and sells 
it to People Magazine, who publishes the photo.  In this case, 
assuming Heidi’s tattoo is copyrighted, is there infringement?  Or 
is this a fair use of the tattoo because it is being reproduced in the 
course of reporting the “news” of a public figure’s day-to-day 
activities?  If it is infringement, however, who was the infringer—
the photographer, the magazine, or both?  Again: who will police 
this type of infringement? 
G. First Amendment Problems 
A major problem with the copying of tattoos and fair use is that 
to properly parody a tattooed person for purposes of criticizing or 
commenting on them, a large portion, if not all, of the tattoo will 
need to be copied.132  For example, to effectively “conjure up” 
Mike Tyson, a subject must bear the tribal facial tattoo that has 
become inextricably linked with Tyson’s persona.133  A different 
tattoo or a tattoo in a different place would simply not be as 
compelling and may not even evoke the subject of the parody.  In 
this example, so long as the use of the original Tyson tattoo is for 
 
 131 See Tattoo Jam 2011, BIZARRE MAG, http://www.bizarremag.com/weird-news/ 
tattoos-body-art/11188/tattoo_jam_2011.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 132 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1994) 
(“When parody takes aim at a particular work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at 
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”). 
 133 Id. 
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purposes of criticizing or commenting on the original work, the use 
should qualify as fair under section 107.134 
Judge Perry’s fair use analysis in Whitmill presents some fair 
use and First Amendment concerns.  In her discussion, Judge Perry 
determined that Warner Brother’s use of Tyson’s tattoo was not 
sufficiently transformative under the first prong of the fair use 
analysis because the image that appeared on Helms’ face was 
nearly identical to the original work.135  However, this finding 
seems to misinterpret the fair use analysis established in section 
107 and developed by United States courts.  While the amount of 
the copyrighted work copied in the Mike Tyson case was arguably 
one hundred percent, the purpose and character of the use was 
imitation for comic effect that created a new work making 
“ridiculous the style and expression of the original.”136  The 
Hangover Part II is a comedy about a bachelor party in Thailand 
gone awry.137  A running joke in both films centers on the main 
characters’ dicey run-ins with Mike Tyson, who plays himself.138  
Based on the definition of parody,139 the goal of the Copyright Act 
to stimulate artist creativity, and the public policy supporting 
findings of fair use to encourage freedom of expression, Judge 
Perry should have found fair use of the tattoo in this case.  If her 
analysis and outcome is applied in future cases similar to this one, 
the standard for and burden of establishing fair use will be 
significantly higher.  If subsequent authors are not allowed to copy 
copyrighted tattoos, even in the name of a parody or fair use, this 
 
 134 The policy behind finding uses such as these to be fair uses stems from the desire to 
promote both artist creativity as well as the freedom of speech and expression. See 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 135 See David, supra note 110. 
 136 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994); Roger v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Parody . . . is when one artist, for comic 
effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in so doing 
creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.”). 
 137 See The Hangover Part II (2011), INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1411697. 
 138 Cohen, supra note 8. 
 139 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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restriction could have serious ramifications on the ability to 
exercise the freedom of speech and expression.140 
III. MEMORIALIZE THE AGREEMENT, BALANCE THE 
INTERESTS 
Part III suggests some solutions that might mitigate the 
conflicts among interests that arise in tattoo infringement cases and 
offers a guide to future courts addressing the issues of copyright 
interests in body tattoos.  The threshold question that must be 
addressed when determining the interests of tattoo artists and tattoo 
bearers is, are tattoos even copyrightable?  Then, it must be asked, 
whether tattoos are or are not copyrightable, is, should they be 
copyrightable?  It seems that as long as tattoos meet the statutory 
requirements, they should be afforded at least some copyright 
protection.  However, given the interests implicated in tattoo cases 
(most notably, the interest of a human subject in controlling his 
own body), copyrighted tattoos should not enjoy the same degree 
of protection as other copyrighted works. 
A. Can You Copyright a Tattoo? 
Before Whitmill v. Warner Brothers in 2011, no court had ever 
directly addressed the question as to whether copyrights are in fact 
copyrightable.141  However, there is some statutory guidance 
regarding this issue.  The Copyright Act explicitly establishes the 
requirements for copyright protection: the work must be an 
“original work of authorship” and it must be “fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.”142  If tattoo designs that satisfy the 
originality requirement were fixed on paper or on a canvas, they 
 
 140 Joe Mullin, Should Copyright Apply to Mike Tyson’s Facial Tattoo?, 
PAIDCONTENT.ORG (May 2, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-mike-
tyson-tattooist-tries-to-block-hangover-2-with-copyright-suit. 
 141 David Post, For the “Life Imitates Law School Exam” File: Tattoo Copyright, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2011, 11:16 am), http://volokh.com/2011/05/25/for-the-
life-imitates-law-school-exam-file-tattoo-copyright.  Without analyzing the issue, Judge 
Perry simply accepted tattoos as copyrightable works and moved on to the remainder of 
the analysis. See David, supra note 110 (quoting Judge Perry as insisting, “[o]f course 
tattoos can be copyrighted . . . I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that”).   
 142 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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would undoubtedly receive copyright protection.  Thus, the 
difficult question is whether a human body qualifies as a “tangible 
medium of expression” for purposes of earning copyright 
protection.143 
Based on the statutory language, the human body does seem to 
qualify as such a medium.  Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a work 
is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” when the 
embodiment of the work in a material object is “sufficiently 
permanent . . . to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”144  
Tattoos are permanently fixed onto a person’s skin and thus can be 
perceived by others for more than “transitory duration.”  They are 
at least perceivable for the duration of the human subject’s 
lifetime.  Assuming that such a time period qualifies as “more than 
transitory,” tattoos can satisfy the statutory requirements and 
should be entitled to at least some protection under the Act. 
Part of addressing the question “are tattoos copyrightable?” 
involves determining what constitutes the original work.  There are 
two possible original work determinations in the tattoo context: the 
sketch, stencil or drawing that precedes the application of the 
tattoo, and the body tattoo itself.  Usually, before permanently 
applying the image to the subject, tattoo artists prepare the image 
in the form of a sketch or drawing or create a tattoo stencil known 
as a “flash.”145  The drawings, sketches or stencils can be 
independently copyrightable providing they comply with the 
statutory requirements of originality and fixation.146  Arguably, if 
an artist copyrighted an image fixed in the form of a tattoo stencil 
and then applied that image onto a human subject, he would be 
creating a derivative work of the original stencil in a different 
medium.147  In this case, the derivative body tattoo would be based 
on a copyrighted work as required by the statute,148 and would 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 What Is Tattoo Flash?, ESSORTMENT, http://www.essortment.com/tattoo-flash-
29579.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). 
 146 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 147 See supra Part I.D.2. 
 148 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
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consist of sufficient modifications (i.e., transcribing it onto a new 
medium) as to make it an “original work of authorship.”149  This 
scenario—where the tattoo is merely a derivative work of an 
original stencil, sketch or drawing—seems to eliminate many of 
the concerns associated with a tattoo subject appearing in public or 
in subsequent works.  In this situation, the subject has a 
nonexclusive license150 to “use” original work embodied in the 
drawing or stencil.151 
In a second possible situation, the creation of a tattoo on a 
human body might not constitute a derivative work of an original 
sketch or drawing, but an original work in and of itself.  Few 
would argue that Picasso’s Guernica is merely a derivative work 
simply because he sketched out several versions of it before 
committing the final copy to a canvas.  Similarly, a tattoo stencil, 
while potentially an independently copyrightable work, need not 
be defined as the original work from which the subsequent body 
tattoo is derived.  Where the tattoo itself is the original work, the 
human subject would not be a licensee of an original work, but 
rather would be the medium in which an original work is fixed and 
expressed.  This scenario is the one in which the conflicts outlined 
above arise.152 
The amount and degree of conflicting interests that arise in the 
situation where the artist is the owner and the tattoo is the original 
work beg the question: Even if tattoos are copyrightable, should 
they be? 
B. Should You Be Able to Copyright a Tattoo? 
In Whitmill v. Warner Bros., the noted copyright scholar David 
Nimmer submitted an affidavit on behalf of defendant Warner 
Brothers arguing that the human body cannot qualify as a “medium 
 
 149 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 150 A nonexclusive license is an implied license that does not require a written 
agreement and does not transfer any ownership of the copyrighted work to the licensee. 
See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d. 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 151 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 152 See discussion supra Part II. 
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of expression” for purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act.153  Because 
a human body is the material object in which a tattoo is fixed, as 
opposed to a piece of paper or a DVD, the analysis of 
copyrightability and the extent of copyright protection allowed 
must necessarily be different for tattoos than that of traditional 
copyrightable works.  However, because tattoos satisfy the 
statutory requirements for copyrightability, as explained above, it 
would be unwise to completely dismiss their copyright protections 
simply because the “medium of expression” is the human body. 
Tattoos present a unique problem not implicated in other forms 
of copyrightable works, primarily because the material object in 
which the work is fixed is a human body.  Because a body is 
involved, some of the rights of copyright owners of tattoos will 
necessarily interfere with the constitutionally recognized right to 
control one’s body.154  For example, if the artist is the copyright 
owner, his exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the 
original work might suggest that he is free to alter or modify the 
tattoo at will.155  However, the right to prepare such works clearly 
conflicts with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy.156  
Furthermore, if the artist is the copyright owner and the tattoo is 
classified as a work of visual art, the owner has the right to prevent 
any “intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of 
the work that would prejudice his “honor or reputation.”157  Again, 
if the artist were allowed to enforce this right against a subject who 
wishes to modify or remove the tattoo, the enforcement would 
interfere with the subject’s constitutional right to control his body. 
 
 153 Declaration of David Nimmer, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 
(E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011).  These statements seem odd considering that in his copyright 
treatise (Nimmer on Copyright), Nimmer claims the exact opposite. See Joe Mullin, 
Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are “Silly,” Says Judge, PAIDCONTENT.ORG 
(May 24, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-judge-shows-sympathy-for-
plaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case. 
 154 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 155 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 156 Perry v. St. Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, n.9 (E.D. Kan. 1995) (noting that 
Congress has defined “human organ” to include skin) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 247e(c)(1) 
(2006)). 
 157 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
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Both of these examples suggest that, if courts were to treat the 
rights of copyright owners of tattoos the same as the rights of other 
copyright owners, subjects would not be allowed to have their 
tattoos modified by another artist or to have their tattoos removed 
entirely.  These restrictions on the subject’s abilities would create a 
significant conflict between the subject’s right to bodily autonomy 
and the copyright interests of the artist.  This conflict unique to 
tattoos indicates that copyright protection of tattoos should be 
enforced differently—and to a lesser extent—than that of other 
copyrightable works. 
C. Solving the Tattoo Infringement Problems 
There are two ways of solving the potential infringement 
problems associated with tattoos.  First, requiring a written 
agreement at the time the tattoo is applied would clarify questions 
of ownership and would allow the parties to determine what may 
be done with the original work.  Alternatively, in situations where 
a copyrighted tattoo appears in subsequent works without the 
owner’s permission (assuming the artist is the owner), courts 
should recognize an implied license for the subject to appear in 
such works.  
1. Writing Requirement 
Requiring a written instrument or a contract detailing who 
owns the work and providing what the subject can do with the 
work would eliminate a great deal of confusion in tattoo copyright 
infringement cases.  This solution seems best suited to the 
problems caused by cases involving celebrity tattoos, which seem 
to be the most likely to occur given the highly visible nature of 
celebrities and the popularity of unique tattoos among celebrities.  
Public figures and celebrities negotiate deals and sign contracts to 
do basically everything in their lives, from endorsement deals, to 
public appearances, to roles in television shows, movies, and 
advertisements.  Requiring them to sign a contract or agreement 
when they get tattoos would not place a great burden on them and 
would resolve many of the conflicts that arise between their 
constitutional interests and tattoo artists’ intellectual property 
interests.  The written agreement would define the ownership 
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rights in the tattoo and dictate what the subject is entitled to do 
with regards to the tattoo.  For example, the agreement could allow 
a subject to alter, modify or remove his or her tattoo without the 
artist/owner’s permission, but could require that the subject obtain 
permission if he or she wishes to appear in a commercial heavily 
featuring the tattoo (such as in Reed). 
In the case of celebrity tattoos, a writing requirement might 
impose an undue burden on tattoo artists, who, unlike many 
celebrities and public figures are not often equipped with an agent, 
a manager and several attorneys, to counsel them every time they 
apply a celebrity tattoo.  However, given the amount and types of 
conflicts that arise in tattoo infringement cases involving a high-
profile celebrity, this may be a burden worth imposing to ensure 
that ownership of the exclusive rights is clear. 
A writing requirement would not pose a substantial burden for 
non-celebrities who get tattoos, either.  At least one state has 
statutory requirements under its health laws stipulating that the 
subject signs an informed consent form before receiving a “body 
art procedure.”158  At the time the subject signs his consent form, 
he could easily sign some kind of basic agreement recognizing, for 
example, that the intellectual property interests in the tattoo belong 
to the artist or to the tattoo parlor but that as the subject, he is 
purchasing a license to display the work in public and to employ 
other tattoo artists to prepare derivative works.  In rare instances 
where the subject wants to negotiate the assignment of the 
intellectual property interests in the tattoo, a writing requirement 
might impose a greater burden by adding time to the tattooing 
process, and perhaps by requiring the parties to seek counsel. 
a) Defining Ownership 
Requiring a signed written instrument in the case of tattoos 
would allow ownership to be more easily defined: first, by 
explicitly stating the intent of the parties with regard to ownership, 
and second, by satisfying the written requirement of works made 
for hire (should this be the ownership arrangement into which the 
parties desire to enter). 
 
 158 See MINN. STAT. § 146B.06(3) (2011). 
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b) Work For Hire 
A work for hire arrangement with the subject as the author and 
owner would solve many of the problems that arise from the 
conflict between copyright ownership interests and the right of a 
person to control his or her own body.159  If the subject is the 
owner, he may freely modify or even remove the tattoo without 
infringing on a copyright.  It may be difficult and rare for a subject 
to qualify as both the author and owner of a work for hire tattoo, 
but in some situations, it seems certain subjects may meet the 
statutory requirements.  A work for hire is either prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his employment or is a work 
“specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work.”160  Where an already-tattooed person 
commissions or specially orders another tattoo, his body, with 
multiple tattoos, could arguably be classified as a “collective 
work.”161  Although this interpretation of a collective work may be 
a bit of a stretch, in such a situation, the multi-tattooed subject 
could become the author of the new tattoo should the parties agree 
to a work for hire arrangement and commemorate the agreement in 
a written instrument signed by them.162  In this scenario, the 
subject, as the author, would have the exclusive rights outlined in 
section 106 and could, if he so chose, transfer some of his rights to 
the tattoo artist.163  For instance, if the subject and the artist had an 
ongoing relationship, the subject might grant the artist the right to 
prepare any derivative works164 (for example, altering or adding to 
the tattoo in the future).  Requiring a written instrument before the 
creation of an original tattoo would allow parties wishing to enter 
 
 159 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 160 A “collective work” is a work in which a number of contributions that constitute 
separate and independent works, are assembled into a collective whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006).  A work for hire arrangement only exists, however, “if the parties expressly agree 
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire.” Id. 
 161 See supra Part I.C. 
 162 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
 163 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
 164 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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into a work for hire relationship to clearly express this intent and to 
satisfy the written requirement of the work for hire provision.165 
c) Joint Work 
Another ownership arrangement that would eliminate many of 
the constitutional concerns with bodily autonomy, and 
simultaneously preserve the creative interests of the artists, is a 
joint work arrangement.  When dealing with original tattoo 
designs, oftentimes the subject will have the original idea for the 
tattoo and will collaborate with the artist to finalize the design.166  
For example, in the case with NBA star Rasheed Wallace, Wallace 
presented the artist, Matthew Reed, with his idea for an arm tattoo 
featuring an Egyptian family.167  Reed drew several sketches and, 
throughout the design development process, Wallace commented 
on and suggested changes to the sketches of the design.168 
Joint works require the intention of both parties to merge their 
separate copyrightable contributions into a single, unitary whole.169  
If the artist and subject collaborated during the design process, 
contributed copyrightable elements to the final product, and 
intended their efforts to be merged into a single piece, they would 
both be authors of the final product and would be co-owners with 
equal rights for the purposes of copyright law.170  As a co-owner, 
each party may use, or license someone else to use, the work, 
provided that he account to the other co-owners for any profits 
derived from such use or licensing.171  Signing an agreement 
memorializing this joint work understanding would clarify the 
rights of both parties and would eliminate many of the problems of 
an artist’s exclusive ownership rights conflicting with the subject’s 
right to control his own body.  For example, the subject would be 
permitted to appear in subsequent works, to find a different artist to 
prepare derivative works and to allow others to copy the tattoo for 
 
 165 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 166 See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 170 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 171 See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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a licensing fee without infringing any of the exclusive rights under 
section 106. 
d) The Exclusive Rights Breakdown 
Negotiating and signing a written agreement between the artist 
and subject would also afford the parties the opportunity to transfer 
ownership of certain exclusive rights.172  Even if the artist was 
deemed the author and thus was initially vested with all copyright 
ownership rights, through a written instrument he might transfer 
some of the particular rights, the enforcement of which might 
present the greatest conflict with the right to bodily autonomy.  
This arrangement would consequently mitigate many of these 
conflicts.  For instance, the artist might choose to transfer the right 
to prepare derivative works to the subject to avoid interfering with 
the subject’s right to control his or her own body.  Further, he 
could transfer the right to publicly display the work to preserve the 
subject’s right to publicity. 
e) Implied Nonexclusive License 
In cases where there is no written agreement and an artist 
copyright owner claims infringement of his copyright for the use of 
the tattoo in a subsequent work, courts should recognize an implied 
nonexclusive license for the subject to appear in such works.173  
Under section 204 of the Copyright Act, transfers of copyright 
ownership must be in writing.174  However, nonexclusive licenses 
may be granted orally or may be implied from conduct.175  Some 
courts have recognized that an implied license results when (1) the 
purported licensee requests the creation of the work, (2) the 
copyright owner creates the work and delivers it to the licensee, 
 
 172 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
 173 The Copyright Act permits copyright holder to grant nonexclusive implied copyright 
licenses. See Foad Consulting Grp. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 825–26 (9th 
Cir. 2001). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 10.03 (1989). 
 174 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006). 
 175 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 173, § 10.03[A], at 10–36; see also Psihoyos v. Pearson 
Educ., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 103, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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and (3) the copyright owner intends the licensee to use the work as 
the licensee does.176 
A licensor-creator of a work who grants a nonexclusive 
implied license does not transfer ownership of his copyrighted 
work to the licensee;177 he merely allows the licensee to use the 
work in a particular way.178  For instance, in the hypothetical 
situation where a paparazzo snaps a photo of a celebrity bearing a 
tattoo and then sells it to a newspaper that publishes the photo, 
courts should recognize an implied nonexclusive license for 
subjects to appear in such works.  To find otherwise would be to 
require that celebrities with tattoos cover up their body art every 
time they appear in public or would require publishers of such 
images to modify the images each time they published them.  Not 
only is this unreasonable and unduly burdensome, but also in the 
case of facial tattoos such as Mike Tyson’s, it would be nearly 
impossible.  If a subject has a nonexclusive license to display his 
tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright 
infringement by the artist/owner.179 
Failing to recognize an implied license in instances where 
tattooed subjects appear in public or in subsequent works would 
counter the frequent goal of tattoo artists of using their subjects as 
free promotion for their skill and business.  For example, artist 
Matthew Reed admitted he took a lower-than-usual fee for his 
Egyptian tattoo on Rasheed Wallace’s arm because he knew that 
he would benefit from the exposure of having his work displayed 
on a popular NBA player’s body.180  Additionally, declining to 
acknowledge an implied license would impede subjects’ abilities to 
display themselves to the public in the way they desire and would 
prevent them from “using” a work for which they paid. 
Perhaps the only instance in which an implied license to 
display the copyrighted work should not be recognized in the 
 
 176 See, e.g., Estate of Roberto Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Psihoyos, 855 F. Supp. 2d. 
 177 See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 178 See id. 
 179 See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 180 Associated Press, Artist Sues over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812. 
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absence of a formal agreement is where the use of the copyrighted 
tattoo is for a commercial purpose.  For instance, in the Rasheed 
Wallace tattoo case, Reed sued Nike for prominently featuring the 
tattoo in an advertising campaign designed to promote Nike 
products.181  This use was for a blatantly commercial purpose, 
whereas the featuring of Mike Tyson and Ed Helms bearing 
Tyson’s tattoo in The Hangover Part II was at best for the indirect 
commercial purpose of making a more valuable film.  Where the 
subject or other party gains financially from the commercial 
exploitation of the copyrighted tattoo, an implied license to use the 
work seems inappropriate.182 
f) Remedies 
Monetary damages in the form of actual and statutory damages 
present few problems in the tattoo infringement context.  
Injunctive relief for infringement of tattoos stands to present the 
greatest amount of constitutional problems and thus should be used 
sparingly, if at all. 
g) Actual and Statutory Damages 
Awarding statutory damages to an artist copyright owner for 
unauthorized direct copying of his design seems fair.  However, 
looking at the Mike Tyson case, for example, there may be many 
difficulties in calculating actual damages in these situations.  To be 
entitled to actual damages in a copyright infringement case, a 
copyright owner must show damages suffered as a result of the 
infringement and the infringer’s profits attained as a result of the 
infringement.183  Showing actual damages resulting from the direct 
 
 181 See Heller, supra note 89. 
 182 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(noting that courts do not sustain fair use claims under section 107 where the secondary 
use “can fairly be characterized as a form of ‘commercial exploitation,’ i.e. where the 
copier directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous financial rewards from its use of the 
copyrighted material”).  Although American Geophysical’s discussion of commercial 
exploitation was in the fair use context, the reasoning is analogous to the implied license 
context; courts should not recognize an implied nonexclusive license to “use,” without 
authorization, a copyrighted tattoo where the subsequent user (the subject) directly and 
conspicuously profits from that unauthorized use. 
 183 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).  
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copying onto Ed Helms’ face as well as in the instance of Mike 
Tyson appearing in the film without permission seems difficult, if 
not impossible.  Further, none of the traditionally recognized forms 
of actual damages occurred in either of these instances.184 
However, in cases where a person commissions a copyrighted 
tattoo from someone other than the owner and without the 
permission of the owner, actual damages in the amount of the 
tattoo application fee could be easily calculated, and the owner 
would be entitled to at least those damages, on the grounds of lost 
customers.185  In cases of the second instance of infringement (the 
featuring of a copyrighted tattoo in a subsequent work), the 
problem of calculating actual damages arises once more.  In cases 
where there are no actual damages, or actual damages are difficult 
to calculate, certain infringement plaintiffs may recover under 
statutory damages. 
Only those owners who registered their copyrights in their 
tattoos before infringement occurred are entitled to statutory 
damages.186  Where the court finds willful infringement, it may, in 
its discretion, raise the maximum amount of statutory damages 
from $30,000 to $150,000 for each work it finds to have been 
infringed.187 
2. Injunctive Relief 
Certain types of injunctions, namely those that would interfere 
with a person’s right to control his own body, should not be 
granted to plaintiffs in tattoo infringement cases, even where the 
court finds infringement.  For example, if the artist is the owner of 
the copyright, he should not be able to demand that a subject cover 
up the tattoo when appearing in public or in movies, 
advertisements, or photos on the grounds that it interferes with his 
exclusive right to display the work publicly.  He also should not be 
entitled to an injunction demanding the removal of a tattoo that has 
been altered without his permission on the grounds that it has 
 
 184 See supra Part I.F.2. 
 185 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, 685 F. Supp. 698, 
711–12 (D. Minn. 1987). 
 186 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). 
 187 17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(2) (2006). 
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infringed his right to prepare derivative works.  Allowing such 
injunctive relief would unreasonably and impermissibly interfere 
with the constitutional right of the subject to control his own body. 
In assessing requests to enjoin the release of works such as 
movies or advertisements that feature a copyrighted tattoo, courts 
should consider the public interest in addition to the interests of the 
owner and the subject.  For example, in Whitmill’s case, Judge 
Perry appropriately balanced all the competing interests.  She 
recognized Whitmill’s copyright interest in the Tyson tattoo, but 
also recognized that the public interest in having The Hangover 
Part II released far outweighed any intellectual property interest he 
had in the work.188  In other words, when evaluating requests for 
injunctions in cases like this, courts must remember that the 
Copyright Act aims not only to provide an incentive to create and 
to protect such creations, but also to promote subsequent creative 
works that build upon existing original works. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the unique interests associated with, and constitutional 
problems raised by tattoos, their copyright protection must be 
treated differently than that of more traditional copyrightable 
works.  Requiring, or at least encouraging, written instruments in 
conjunction with tattoo creation, or recognizing implied 
nonexclusive licenses in original tattoos would help to mitigate 
these conflicts. 
 
 
 188 Cohen, supra note 90. 
